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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the district court erred in refusing to set aside the default judgment 
for lack of service, resulting in lack of jurisdiction and a void judgment. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 
768, 771 (Utah App. 1997). This issue was raised in the motion to set aside the default 
judgment. (R. 105,203-06.) 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment on equitable grounds justifying relief. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
App. 1989). This issue was raised in the motion to set aside the default judgment. (R. 
106,208-11.) 
3. Whether the district court erred in ruling that the motion to set aside the 
default judgment was untimely. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 
768, 771 (Utah App. 1997); Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 
(Utah App. 1990). This issue was raised in the motion to set aside the default judgment. 
(R. 106,207.) 
4. Whether the district court erred in ruling that All American has no 
meritorious defense to the action. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Erickson v. Schenkers International 
Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah 1994). This issue was raised in the motion 
to set aside the default judgment. (R. 107, 211.) 
5. Whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees to plaintiff 
without a showing of any legal basis for recovery of fees. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 U.A.R. 68, 
72 (Utah 1997). This issue was raised generally by the motion to set aside the default 
judgment, challenging all elements of that judgment, and specifically under "any other 
reason justifying relief." (R. 98-109.) 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Relief from the default judgment is based on Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., set forth 
verbatim in the Addendum. (Add. 10.)1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for refund of life insurance premiums under a claimed ten-day 
return privilege. The policies were sold by defendant Munyan & Associates and issued 
by defendants All American Life, Midland National Life, and Liberty Life. Plaintiff 
alleged that the claims were timely because the policies were supposedly never delivered. 
Since entry of the order denying relief from the default judgment, Rule 60(b) has been amended to 
delete ground (4), referring to the defendant's nonappearance for lack of personal service. (Add. 12.) 
That ground was considered "ambiguous" and, in any event, is fairly comprehended within the former 
ground (5), now listed as (4), referring to a judgment that is void. Rule 60(b), Advisory Committee Note 
(Add. 11); see Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290-91 (Utah 1986) (discussing both grounds in context 
of defective service). Amendments to procedural rules are presumed to apply retroactively, even to cases 
pending on appeal. E.g., Long v. Simmons, 11 F.3d 878, 879 (5th Cir. 1996); see Rule 1(b), Utah R. Civ. 
P; Rule 86, Fed. R. Civ. P. Accordingly, the amended version of Rule 60(b) applies to this appeal. 
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(R. 1-5.) Plaintiff claims to have served All American by delivering a copy of the 
summons and complaint on CT Corp., All American's agent for service of process. (R. 
24, 34.) When All American did not answer the complaint, plaintiff took a default 
judgment in the amount of $92,219. (R. 34, 41, Add. 4.) 
However, CT Corp. was not served with process for All American; consequently, 
All American was never notified of the action. (R. 142-44). Moreover, plaintiff waited 
for eighteen months to notify All American of the default judgment, at which time 
plaintiffs counsel simply telephoned All American and demanded payment. (R. 112-14, 
178.) Within sixty days, All American filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, 
demonstrating that it was not served with process and that, in any event, plaintiff had no 
grounds for a ten-day refund because the policies were in fact delivered over two years 
before the refund request. (R. 98, 112, 117-37.) 
The district court denied the motion to set aside, concluding that All American 
was properly served, that its motion was untimely, and that the underlying merits and 
equities did not justify relief. (R. 229, Add. 1; R. 148-61.) All American appeals from 
that order, which was certified for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b). (R. 230, Add. 2.) 
The court stayed enforcement of the order pending appeal. (R. 244, Add. 8.) 2 
All claims against the other defendants are resolved or unrelated. After obtaining the default 
judgment against All American, plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of all claims against Midland and 
Liberty. (R. 71 and 87.) The claims against Munyan & Associates pertain to their alleged fraud in 
selling the policies and have no relation to the issues on this appeal. Those claims remain pending 
following denial of Munyans' motion to dismiss. (R. 5, 217.) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Beginning in 1991, plaintiff contracted with Munyan & Associates, independent 
management consultants ("Munyans"), to procure life insurance policies on plaintiffs 
employees. The policies were issued by All American Life Insurance Company, Midland 
National Life Insurance Co., and Liberty Life Insurance Co. Plaintiffs employees 
signed receipts acknowledging delivery of the All American policies between July 1991 
and October 1993. (Complaint, ^ 10, Exh. A, R. 3, 11-12; Affidavit of J.W. Dewbre, ffif 
5-6, Exh. A, R. 112, 117-37.) 
In a letter to All American, dated June 9, 1994, plaintiff requested a refund of all 
policy premiums under the "10 day free look" provision, which allows the policyholder 
the right to return the policy for any reason "within ten days after its delivery." See 
U.C.A. § 31A-22-423. This letter alleged various fraudulent activities by the Munyans, 
but conceded, "We are confident these activities were neither condoned nor sanctioned 
by US Life [All American]." (Complaint, Exh. B, R. 13.) On July 13, 1994, All 
American responded to plaintiff, explaining that the ten-day return period had long since 
expired, precluding any right to a premium refund. However, the response letter 
requested additional information in order to investigate the alleged misconduct by the 
Munyans. (Dewbre Aff t, ffif 9-12, Exh. C, R. 113, 140.) Having received no ftirther 
information from plaintiff by September 1, 1994, All American wrote once more to 
plaintiff, believing the matter was concluded: "We assume all of these issues have been 
resolved since we have not received this documentation." {Id., fflj 13-14, Exh. D, R. 113-
4 
14, 141.) While plaintiff claims to have sent a subsequent request for copies of the 
signed statements showing delivery of the policies (R. 180), the record contains no 
further correspondence between the parties (Dewbre Aff t, f^ 15, R. 114). 
Over one year later, in January 1996, plaintiff filed the complaint in this action, 
seeking refund of the policy premiums. (R. 1.) Plaintiff claims to have served All 
American through delivery of the summons and complaint by a constable to CT 
Corporation System, All American's designated agent for service of process. (Affidavit 
of Chris L. Schmutz, fflf 7-8, R. 177.) However, by some error or oversight, not yet fully 
explained, the intended summons and complaint never reached CT Corp. Plaintiff 
intended that the process papers for both All American and defendant Liberty Life were 
to be served at the same time, by the same constable, on the same service agent, CT Corp. 
(id.), but CT Corp. received only the summons and complaint for Liberty Life; it did not 
receive papers for All American. (Affidavit of Sandy Streeper, fflf 3-8, R. 143-44.) 
Whether the constable misplaced or failed to deliver the summons and complaint directed 
to All American, or erroneously believed the All American papers were clipped to the 
Liberty Life papers when they were not, or clipped the All American papers underneath 
those for Liberty Life, without specifying that there were two sets of process for two 
different defendants, is unknown. Whatever happened, CT Corp. has no record of 
receiving a summons and complaint for All American, and All American consequently 
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received no notice of this action. (Streeper AfFt, If 9, R. 144; Dewbre AfFt, 1ffll6-l8, R-
114.)3 
When All American did not answer the complaint, plaintiff promptly took a 
default judgment, without making any further effort to contact All American or verify its 
notice of the action. (R. 33-42.) The judgment, dated February 27, 1996, is for $92,219, 
which includes the full amount of premiums paid to All American, plus prejudgment 
interest, costs, and attorney fees. (R. 41, Add. 4.) 
Plaintiff failed to send notice of the default judgment to All American, even 
though plaintiff and its counsel had corresponded with All American prior to the action 
and, therefore, knew precisely how to contact All American again, if they had desired. 
Instead, plaintiff sent notice of the default judgment addressed to Michelle Rehrman at 
CT Corp., All American's agent only for service of process. (Schmutz Aff t, f^ 9, R. 177, 
193.) Because the envelope containing the notice of default judgment and the notice 
itself were not addressed to any particular corporation or defendant, CT Corp. did not 
know which party was to receive the document; accordingly, CT Corp. returned the 
The constable claims that he served both sets of process on Michelle Rehrman, a CT Corp. 
employee, with the All American summons on top, citing as proof Aw entry of her name "on the return 
copy" of the summons, the copy he filed in the court. (Affidavit of Silvan D. Warnick, ffif 12-13, R. 166-
67, emp. added.) However, entry of the employee's name on the return copy of a summons can be made 
at any time prior to filing and does not prove that a separate copy of the summons was actually served, or 
that the documents actually served were in any particular order. The constable states that his "practice" 
is to stamp the summons and write in the date and time of service and the name of the person served (id, 
H 12, R. 166), but he obviously deviated from that practice by omitting the date and time of service from 
the All American summons (R. 22), and leaving the stamp on the Liberty Life summons entirely blank 
(R. 16). The constable also failed to document the time of service on the affidavit of service for either 
defendant, as required by U.C.A. § 78-12a-2(3). (R. 18, 24.) Given these lapses and inconsistencies, it is 
evident that the constable did not adhere to either legal or usual practice in the service of process in this 
case, creating the likelihood that CT Corp. did not receive the All American summons, and that 
Rehrman's name was written on the return copy of the summons only as an afterthought. 
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notice to plaintiffs counsel for identifying information. (Streeper Aff t, fflf 10-11, R. 
144, 147, 192.) Plaintiffs counsel never supplied the requested information; 
consequently, All American never received the notice of default judgment. (Id., ^ 12, R. 
144; Schmutz Aff t, ffi[ 10-11, R. 177-78; Dewbre Aff t, ffif 16-18, R. 114.) 
On July 7, 1997, over sixteen months after obtaining the default judgment, 
plaintiffs counsel telephoned J.W. Dewbre, All American's vice president and general 
counsel in Dallas, Texas, regarding payment of the default judgment. Mr. Dewbre 
responded that he knew nothing of any such judgment, but would investigate and 
respond. The next day, local counsel for All American contacted plaintiffs counsel for 
information, which was supplied. (Schmutz Aff t, ^ 13, R. 178-79; Dewbre Aff t, ffi[ 16-
17, R. 114.) 
Within two months after learning of the default judgment, All American filed a 
motion to set aside the judgment. (R. 98.) All American argued under Rule 60(b) that 
service of process was lacking or improper; that All American failed to respond through 
no fault of its own; that it had a valid defense to plaintiffs refund claim; and that 
enforcing a default judgment of this high amount, including unfounded attorney fees, 
was unjust under the circumstances. (R. 101-09, 199-212.) The district court rejected 
those arguments, accepting plaintiffs arguments that service was proper, that the motion 
was untimely, and that there was no other reason justifying relief. (R. 229-30, Add. 1-3; 
R. 148-63.) As indicated above, the order denying relief from the default judgment was 
certified for immediate appeal (R. 230), and All American commenced this appeal (R. 
7 
232). The order is stayed pending appeal. (R. 244, Add. 8.) The Utah Supreme Court 
subsequently transferred the case to this Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Utah courts have traditionally been liberal in setting aside default judgments in the 
interest of permitting disputes to be decided on the merits, especially when there is 
reasonable justification for the defendant's nonappearance. To allow a plaintiff to retain 
a judgment obtained without actual notice or a hearing, particularly when efforts to 
prevent knowledge of the judgment appear intentional, is "harsh and oppressive." 
All American is entitled to relief from the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) 
because the judgment is void for lack of notice and lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff failed 
to serve CT Corp., All American's agent for service of process; moreover, it is 
undisputed that All American received no actual notice of the action. Because service 
was defective, the district court lacked jurisdiction, and its judgment is consequently 
void. 
All American is entitled to relief from the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) 
on grounds of equity and justice. All American has no culpability in this action, having 
received no actual notice of the action or the default judgment. All American's service 
agent also denies receiving notice of this action. If All American had known of the 
action, it would have successfully defended the action and plaintiff would have 
recovered no judgment against All American. By contrast, plaintiff failed to notify All 
American of either the action or the default judgment, even though plaintiff knew All 
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American's address and could have made contact if desired, as evidenced by the ease 
with which plaintiff subsequently made demand for payment. Absent relief from the 
judgment, plaintiff will retain an unfair windfall, being entitled to no recovery on the 
merits of its claims. 
All American's motion for relief is timely because the time limits in Rule 60(b) do 
not apply to a judgment that is void. Moreover, the request for relief under 60(b)(6) is 
timely because it was filed within a reasonable time. All American filed its motion 
within two months after learning of the judgment. The expiration of eighteen months 
between the judgment and the motion for relief is attributable to plaintiffs failure to give 
notice of the judgment as required by law. 
All American has a meritorious defense to plaintiffs claims, which are based on 
the erroneous assumption that the All American policies were never delivered. All 
American has presented unrefiited evidence that its policies were delivered over two 
years before this action was filed. Moreover, All American has no liability for the 
separate claims against the Munyons. 
Finally, plaintiffs attorney fee award must be reversed because plaintiff has 
identified no contractual or statutory basis for recovery of attorney fees. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah cases uniformly adhere to the principle that default judgments are disfavored 
in the law because they deny access to courts for just resolution of disputes. 
Accordingly, default judgments should be liberally set aside when the moving party is 
9 
not at fault and justice demands relief. These principles are plainly set forth in Interstate 
Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980), reversing 
a default judgment based on disputed notice: 
[DJefault judgments . . . are not favored in the law. . . . Speaking generally 
about such problems, it is to be kept in mind that access to the courts for 
the protection of rights and the settlement of disputes is one of the most 
important factors in the maintenance of a peaceable and well-ordered 
society. . . . 
The uniformly acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants 
the opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without 
serious injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally 
indulgent toward the setting aside of default judgments where there is a 
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and 
where timely application is made to set it aside. Consistent with the 
objective just stated, where there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end 
that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of the 
controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law and 
justice. 
See also Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 
(Utah 1994) (vacating default judgment: "Generally, courts should be liberal in granting 
relief against default judgments so that cases may be tried on the merits."); Katz v. 
Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986) (court should be indulgent in setting aside default 
judgment, and doubt should be resolved in favor of relief); Westinghouse Elec. Supply 
Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contr., Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) (courts favor relief 
from default judgments because "the very reason for the existence of courts is to afford 
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice between them"); Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 316 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 1962) ("To clamp a judgment rigidly 
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and irrevocably on a party without a hearing is obviously a harsh and oppressive thing."); 
12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.22[3][a]-[b] (1998).4 
Ordinarily, the standard of review for relief from a default judgment is abuse of 
discretion; however, when the asserted basis for relief is lack of jurisdiction, resulting 
from defective service and lack of notice, the district court has no discretion, and 
entitlement to relief becomes a question of law. Accordingly, the standard of review in 
this case is correction of error, and no deference is owed to the district court. See 
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768, 771 (Utah App. 1997); Workman v. Nagle 
Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 754 n.l 1 (Utah App. 1990). 
Relief from default judgments is authorized by Rule 55(c), Utah R. Civ. P., which 
provides that "a judgment by default" may be set aside "in accordance with Rule 60(b)." 
Rule 60(b) states that "the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from 
a final judgment" for any of the stated reasons. (Add. 10.) Applying this rule to default 
judgments, the Utah Supreme Court has developed a three-part analysis for relief. As 
set forth in State v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053, 1055-56 (Utah 1983), a defendant 
seeking relief from a default judgment must show that (1) at least one of the grounds for 
relief in Rule 60(b) applies; (2) the motion for relief is timely; and (3) the movant has a 
meritorious defense to the action. See also Erickson v. Schenkers International 
Because a default judgment denies access to the court, such judgment implicates the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11, which not only guarantees that "every person . . . shall 
have a remedy" for injury done to him, but that "no person shall be barred from . . . defending before any 
tribunal in this State . . . any civil cause to which he is a party." (Emp. added.) Barring a defendant from 
contesting claims filed without notice is equally unconstitutional as barring a plaintiff from suing on a 
claim before it is known. See, e.g., Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah 1986) (striking 
down statute of repose under open courts provision). 
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Forwarders, Inc., supra, 882 P.2d at 1148; Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 
App. 1987). Those conditions for relief from a default judgment are satisfied in the 
present case. 
POINT I: ALL AMERICAN IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF FROM THE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER RULES 60(b)(4) AND (6). 
Rule 60(b), grounds (4) and (6), provide for relief as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment... for the 
following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void; . . . or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. [Add. 10.] 
Either reason for relief applies under the facts of this case, where service of process is 
lacking. 
A. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(4), 
A default judgment entered without service of process is void for lack of 
jurisdiction. For example, in Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986), the plaintiff 
filed a divorce complaint and purported to serve the defendant, who was in prison, by 
delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the prison personnel office. A 
default divorce decree was later entered. The defendant denied receiving the papers and 
sought to set aside the default decree ten years after it was entered. The court granted 
relief, reasoning that because service was defective, "the court was without jurisdiction 
to enter the original decree of divorce." Id. at 290. After discussing both former 
60(b)(4) and (5), the court concluded that "because of the ineffective service of 
process . . . the decree is void for lack of jurisdiction." Id. at 291. 
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This Court recently followed the same analysis in Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 
949 P.2d 768 (Utah App. 1997). There, the plaintiff sued to collect a debt. Unable to 
accomplish personal service, the plaintiffs attorney filed a false affidavit to support 
service by mail and obtained a default judgment. Over three years later, the defendant 
learned of the judgment and sought to set it aside, denying that he was served either 
personally or by mail. This Court granted relief under former 60(b)(5), the voidness 
provision, reasoning that "whether service of process was proper is a jurisdictional 
issue," reviewed for correctness. Id. at 771. "[I]f jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment 
cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs." Id. (citation 
omitted). A judgment entered without jurisdiction is "void" and "must be set aside." Id. 
See also Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 753-54 (Utah App. 1990) 
(default judgment set aside as void for lack of notice to defendants); Skanchy v. Calcados 
Ortope SA, 952 P.2d 1071, 1074 (Utah 1998) (default judgment based on invalid service 
is void); 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.44[3]. 
Similarly, the default judgment entered in the present case is void for lack of 
jurisdiction because All American did not receive proper service of process. Plaintiff 
claims that it served All American by requesting a constable to deliver the summons and 
complaint to CT Corp., All American's service agent. However, the only evidence of 
service is the return copy of the summons on which the constable wrote the name of a 
CT Corp. employee with whom he was familiar. The return copy of the summons shows 
no date or time of service, and the affidavit of service fails to document the time of 
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service, as required by law. {See note 3, supra.) By contrast, CT Corp., whose business 
is to receive service for nonresident corporations, denies receiving service for All 
American. Moreover, All American indisputably received no actual notice of the action. 
In the course of attempting to serve two defendants at the same time, it is likely that 
plaintiff or the constable omitted or misplaced the All American summons and believed 
that it was served, when in fact it was not. Accordingly, the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to enter the default judgment, and the judgment must be set aside as void.5 
B. Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6). 
As noted above, Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a default judgment for "any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." This is described as a 
"catch-all" provision for relief, covering all possible grounds not enumerated previously 
in the Rule. This provision is a "grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a 
particular case." 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.48[1] (citations omitted). It 
"vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such 
action is appropriate to accomplish justice." Id. (citations omitted). For example, this 
catch-all provision may apply to grant relief from a judgment entered without proper 
5
 At the very least, because of the dispute in evidence over service of process, this Court should 
vacate the judgment and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on sufficiency of notice. In 
addressing a motion for relief from a default judgment, a trial court should not resolve factual disputes 
related to service of process without an evidentiary hearing. See Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 913-15 
(2nd Cir. 1983) (conflicting affidavits from process server and defendants "raised sufficiently serious 
questions of fact to warrant an evidentiary hearing"); United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114, 1122-25 (1st 
Cir. 1987); 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.44[4]. This course is consistent with the policy of 
resolving doubts in favor of relief from the default judgment. E.g., Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA 
Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1980) (court improperly denied relief from default 
judgment without evidentiary hearing to resolve factual dispute regarding notice). 
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notice of the proceedings, in violation of due process. See Bish 's Sheet Metal Co. v. 
Luras, 359 P.2d 21, 22 (Utah 1961). 
Under Utah law, whenever the facts present a conflict, uncertainty, or confusion 
regarding proper service of process and notice of the action, the courts exercise their 
equitable power under Rule 60(b) to grant relief from the default judgment. For 
example, in May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984), an assault action, the plaintiff 
engaged in settlement negotiations with defendant's insurance adjuster before filing suit. 
Id. Defendant was served with a summons indicating that a copy of the complaint was 
available from the court clerk; however, the plaintiff later filed a second return of service 
indicating that a copy of the complaint accompanied the summons. Following entry of 
default judgment, the defendant sought relief, denying receipt of the complaint or notice 
of the default hearing. Neither had the plaintiff attempted to contact the adjuster with 
whom he had previously negotiated. The court granted relief under Rule 60(b), noting 
that "the contradictions engendered in the service of process,. . . inconsistent returns, 
efforts to reach a prelitigation settlement, [and] the immediacy in seeking relief... all 
suggest justice in granting relief from a default." Id. at 1110. If "default would not have 
occurred" but for the confusion over proper notice, "the ends of justice require an 
opportunity for the defendant to have his day in court." Id. The court also observed that 
where the parties had been engaged in negotiations prior to commencement of the action, 
"courtesy and equity required" the plaintiff to advise defendant of his intent to pursue 
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legal action. Id. at 1110-11. Under all the circumstances, "equity and good conscience" 
justified relief from the default judgment. Id. at 1111. 
Several similar cases illustrate this judicial readiness to set aside default 
judgments when there is confusion and conflict over proper notice. In Woody v. Rhodes, 
461 P.2d 465 (Utah 1969), the sheriff served one defendant, but the summons actually 
named another defendant. Because the defendant served may have been mislead, the 
default judgment against him was set aside under Rule 60(b). Id. at 466. In Locke v. 
Peterson, 285 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1955), the summons served on the defendant was not a 
true copy of the summons filed with the court, creating uncertainty regarding filing and 
service of the complaint. The court granted relief from the default judgment: 
This situation created sufficient confusion that the motion to set aside . . . 
should have been granted . . . consistent with our declared policy that in 
case of uncertainty, default judgments should be set aside to allow trial on 
the merits. [Id. at 1113.] 
See also Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. AGLA Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 370-71 
(Utah 1980) (vacated default judgment because of factual dispute over notice of trial 
date); Security Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. West, 437 P.2d 214, 215-16 (Utah 1968) 
(vacated default judgment because of "confusion" regarding notice, available defense to 
the action, and "spirit of the rules" entitling defendant "to his day in court"). 
The foregoing authorities compel equitable relief from the default judgment in 
this case. The parties engaged in preHtigation correspondence in an effort to resolve the 
claims amicably. In fact, after a long period of silence from plaintiff, All American 
wrote to plaintiff in September 1994 expressing the belief that "all of these issues have 
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been resolved." (R. 141.) Over sixteen months later, plaintiff commenced this action, 
without extending All American the courtesy of notice regarding plaintiffs intent to seek 
a judgment. See May v. Thompson, supra, at 1110-11. Plaintiff then obtained a default 
judgment and waited another sixteen months before notifying All American of that 
judgment. When plaintiff wanted to contact All American, for the purpose of collecting 
the judgment, it did so with little effort. Upon learning of the judgment, All American 
promptly sought relief by showing the absence of notice, the suspicion and confusion 
surrounding alleged service of process, and the failure to give notice of the default 
judgment. Plaintiffs entire course of action appears carefully calculated to conceal the 
litigation and judgment from All American until the time limits in 60(b) had passed and 
relief from the judgment appeared unlikely. Moreover, this course was followed with 
full knowledge of All American's absolute defense to the refund claims. Not only would 
default not have occurred with proper notice, but plaintiff would have recovered nothing 
on its claims. See id at 1110; Dewbre Aff t, ffij 11, 19, R. 113-14. Accordingly, if relief 
is denied, plaintiff recovers an unjust windfall. 
In summary, All American is not at fault, and vacating the judgment results in no 
unfair prejudice to plaintiff. These facts, taken in the aggregate, require this Court, in 
"equity and good conscience," to vacate the default judgment and allow All American its 
day in court. Relief here is necessary "to accomplish justice." 
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POINT II: ALL AMERICAN'S MOTION FOR RELIEF IS TIMELY. 
A. Rule 60(b) Time Limits Do Not Apply. 
Under Rule 60(b), a motion for relief under grounds (4) and (6) "shall be made 
within a reasonable time." (Add. 10.) However, even this reasonable-time standard has 
no application to a judgment that is void for lack of jurisdiction, based on defective 
service of process: 
There is only one exception to this [reasonable-time] rule, and that applies 
to judgments that are totally void. . . . [T]here is and can be no time limit 
on judicial relief from a judgment that is, in fact, already a nullity and 
always subject to direct and collateral attack. Anytime is a "reasonable" 
time to set aside a void judgment. [12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 
60.65[1], citations omitted.] 
Utah courts follow this exception in granting relief from judgments that are void 
for lack of service. For example, in Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 1986), 
discussed above, the plaintiff claimed to have served the incarcerated defendant through 
delivery of process to the prison personnel office. Ten years after the default judgment 
was entered, the defendant moved to set it aside on the grounds of defective service. The 
court granted relief, holding that the motion was timely, regardless of whether it was 
filed within a reasonable time: 
[W]here the judgment is void because of a fatally defective service of 
process, the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have no application. [Id. at 
290.] 
Similarly, in Woody v. Rhodes, 461 P.2d 465 (Utah 1969), discussed above, the court 
granted relief from a default judgment one year after it was entered, based on invalid 
service of process. Regarding timeliness of the motion, the court held, "The three-
18 
months provision provided for in Rule 60(b) has no application to this situation." Id. at 
466. See also Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, supra, 949 P.2d at 771 n.2 (granting relief 
from default judgment after three years because "the time limitations of Rule 60(b) have 
no application" to a void judgment). 
As demonstrated above, the default judgment in the present case is void for lack 
of jurisdiction, based on lack of service and notice to All American. Therefore, the time 
limits of Rule 60(b) do not apply, and the judgment should be set aside. 
B. AH American Sought Relief Within A Reasonable Time. 
Even if the reasonable-time standard is applied to the requested relief under Rule 
60(b)(6), the equitable catch-all provision, that standard is met under the circumstances 
of this case. See generally 12 Moore's Federal Practice, supra, § 60.65[1] (what time is 
"reasonable" is not a fixed concept, but "depends on the facts and circumstances of each 
case," citing cases in which relief was granted after several years). See also Ney v. 
Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956) (granting relief from default judgment eleven 
months after entry because defendant believed her ex-husband was responsible for the 
claim). Here, All American challenged the default judgment within two months after 
learning of it. The passage of eighteen months from entry of the judgment is attributable 
entirely to the plaintiffs own failure and delay in notifying All American of the 
judgment. 
Rule 55(a)(2), Utah R. Civ. P., requires notice to the party in default, as provided 
in Rule 58A(d). Rule 58A(d) requires that a copy of the signed judgment be served as 
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provided in Rule 5. Rule 5(b)(1) requires that service of a judgment on a party be 
accomplished by delivering or mailing the judgment to the last known address of the 
party or the party's attorney. As applied by this Court in Workman v. Nagle Constr., 
Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), failure to give the notice required by Rule 58A(d) 
does not invalidate the judgment, but noncompliance "is a weighty factor in determining 
the timeliness of later challenges to the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) through 
(7)." Id. at 751. Specifically, "if a losing party has remained ignorant of a judgment in 
part because the prevailing party has not complied with Rule 58A(d), the resulting delay 
is more reasonable for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5)-(7)." Id. In Workman, a delay of 
fifteen months in seeking relief from the default judgment was considered reasonable 
because the defendant's "ignorance of the judgment until that time was due in part to a 
lack of notice that the plaintiff was required to provide." Id. at 752. 
Under the foregoing authorities, All American sought relief within a reasonable 
time because the delay of eighteen months from entry of the default judgment to filing of 
the motion to set aside was due to plaintiffs failure to provide notice of the judgment in 
compliance with Rule 58A(d). Plaintiff claims to have complied with the rule by sending 
notice of the judgment to an employee at CT Corp., but the notice failed to specify which 
defendant was to receive it. Consequently, CT Corp. returned the notice to plaintiff for 
further information, and plaintiff failed to take any further action. Under the rules set 
forth above, plaintiff was required to serve All American, not by mailing a copy to CT 
Corp., the agent for service of process, but by delivering or mailing a copy to All 
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American at its last known address. Plaintiff plainly knew All American's address 
through the exchange of correspondence prior to filing the action. Moreover, plaintiff 
had no difficulty contacting All American for purposes of collecting the judgment. 
Given the ease with which plaintiff could have notified All American of the judgment, its 
failure to do so can only be regarded as intentional, for the purpose of concealing the 
judgment until the time periods in Rule 60(b) had elapsed and relief from the judgment 
became more difficult. Under these facts, the timing of All American's efforts at relief 
must be considered reasonable, and plaintiff should be estopped to assert that the motion 
is untimely. See Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 656 P.2d 1009, 1012 (Utah 1982) 
(plaintiff may be estopped from asserting time bar where its own conduct, ostensibly to 
allow the 60(b) time limits to expire, caused the defendant's delay in seeking relief). 
POINT III: ALL AMERICAN HAS A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THE 
ACTION. 
The third requirement for relief from a default judgment is that the defendant set 
forth specific facts showing a meritorious defense to the plaintiffs claims. State v. 
Musselman, supra, 667 P.2d at 1057-58. The purpose of this requirement is "to prevent 
the necessity of judicial review of questions which, on the face of the pleadings, are 
frivolous." Erickson v. Schenkers International Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 
(Utah 1994). To be "meritorious," a defense need not be proven. "A defense is 
sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried." 
Id. at 1149. Whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Id. at 1148. For example, in Erickson, the plaintiff alleged negligence and 
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breach of a shipping contract resulting in loss of the goods shipped. The court held that 
the defendant adequately asserted a meritorious defense by denying each basis for 
liability and asserting affirmative defenses. Because the defenses were not frivolous, 
they were entitled to be tried and justified relief from the default judgment. Id. at 1149. 
In the present case, plaintiff seeks a refund of life insurance premiums under a so-
called "10 day free look" provision, which allows the policyholder to return the policy 
for any reason "within ten days after its delivery." See U.C.A. § 31A-22-423. Plaintiffs 
complaint alleges that none of the policies was delivered fl[ 13, R. 3) and attaches a list of 
the policies issued by All American, with the names of individual insureds. Upon 
learning of the default judgment, All American responded with written receipts, signed 
by each of the insureds, acknowledging delivery of the policies between July 1991 and 
October 1993. (R. 117-37.) Accordingly, the All American policies were, in fact, 
delivered over two years before plaintiff filed its complaint, and the ten-day return 
privilege had long since expired. Therefore, plaintiff has no legal right to refund of the 
policy premiums under the statute relied upon. Moreover, plaintiff has conceded that the 
activities alleged against the Munyans "were neither condoned nor sanctioned by [All 
American]." (R. 13.) Therefore, All American cannot be liable for those activities. 
Plaintiffs claims, if any, should be pursued against the Munyans, who remain parties in 
the district court, not against All American. 
In summary, the defenses raised by All American are meritorious because they are 
not frivolous and they are "entitled to be tried." See Erickson, supra, at 1149. In fact, 
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All American's defense to the claims is absolute. Therefore, the default judgment should 
be vacated to allow All American to assert its meritorious defense to the action. 
POINT IV: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF 
ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT A SHOWING OF ANY LEGAL 
BASIS FOR FEES. 
In the default judgment, the district court awarded plaintiff $1,000 in attorney 
fees, plus an unknown amount of additional fees "expended in collecting" the judgment. 
(R. 42, Add. 5; see Affidavit of Fees and Costs, R. 31, Add. 6.) However, plaintiff 
demonstrated no legal basis for an award of attorney fees; therefore, the award must be 
reversed. 
"Utah has consistently followed the well-established rule that attorney fees cannot 
be recovered unless provided for by contract or statute." Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & 
Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Utah 1991). See, e.g., Arnica Mutual Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah App. 1989) ("attorney fees are not recoverable in the absence of 
a contractual or statutory basis"). Moreover, "[affidavits in support of an award of 
attorney fees must . . . set forth specifically the legal basis for the award." Rule 4-505(1), 
Code of Jud. Admin. See Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 
1194-95 (Utah App. 1993). Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 331 U.A.R. 68, 72 (Utah 1997). 
In this case, no contract or statute authorizes an award of attorney fees. 
Furthermore, plaintiff failed to set forth any legal basis for the award in the Affidavit of 
Fees and Costs, as required by Rule 4-505(1). (R. 31.) Accordingly, the district court 
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had no authority to grant an award of attorney fees in the default judgment, and the 
award must, therefore, be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the default judgment and remand 
the case to allow All American to answer the complaint and defend the action on the 
merits. Alternatively, the Court should reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing on 
whether plaintiff properly served All American with notice of the action. In any event, 
the award of attorney fees should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 7 ^ day of May, 1998. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Bv: ^^<^^C *&T ? 2 < « £ ^ 
Gregory M. Simonsen 
Merrill F. Nelson 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to be mailed through United States mail, postage prepaid, this 7***^ 
day of May, 1998, to the following: 
Chris L. Schmutz 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
J^£~ ^^Cg>^i^vV^ 
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Chris L. Schmutz 
CHRIS L SCHMUTZ, P.C. 
265 East 100 South #300 
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Third Judicial District 
NOV t 7 1997 
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By Cepuy Q»k_ VQ±, c M f r j l ^ . 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLASSIC CABINETS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY dba US LIFE, a New Jersey 
corporation, MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE 
INSURANCE CO., a joint stock 
corporation, LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE 
CO., a South Carolina corporation, 
LEON J. MUNYAN and KATHY L. 
MUNYAN dba MUNYAN & 
ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING 
ALL AMERICAN'S MOTION 
TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960900355 CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
The Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Against All American Life 
Insurance Company (hereinafter the "Motion") has been submitted to the Court for 
decision. The Motion was filed on or after September 8, 1997, and was 
accompanied by a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment Against All American Life Insurance Company, and the Affidavits of 
J.W. Dewbre and Sandy Streeper. In.response to the Motion, Plaintiff Classic 
Cabinets, Inc., filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment (hereinafter "Classic's Memorandum"), and the Affidavits of Silvan D. 
Warnick and Chris L. Schmutz. Thereafter, Defendant All American Life Insurance 
Company filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment. 
Neither party requested oral argument on the Motion, and no oral argument 
was presented to the Court. 
The Court has carefully considered the Motion and all the foregoing 
memoranda and affidavits, as well as appropriate pleadings in the file, and the 
Court having fully reviewed the facts presented therein and the legal arguments of 
both parties, and the Court having determined, for the reasons stated in Classic's 
Memorandum, that the Motion should be denied, and other good cause appearing 
therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED that the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment Against All 
American Life Insurance Company is hereby DENIED; and it is further 
ORDERED under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that there is 
no just reason for delay and the foregoing is a final and appealable order. 
a. DATED this / / day of November, 1997. 
"T 
kO 
Frank G. 
Third Dis 
2 
000002 
a^o 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLASSIC CABINETS, INC-, a 
Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, dba US LIFE, a 
New Jersey corporation, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 960900355 
The Court has reviewed defendant All American Life Insurance 
Company's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. For the 
reasons stated in plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion to Set Aside the Default 
Judgment. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate Order, 
Dated this .day of October, 1997, 
FRANK G. NOEL 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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Chris L. Schmutz 
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, P.C. 
265 East 100 South #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801 )364 -0256 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLASSIC CABiNETS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 960900355 CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, ALL AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY dba US LIFE, 
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
LEON J . MUNYAN and KATHY L. 
MUNYAN, 
Defendants. 
In the above-captioned action, Defendant All American Life Insurance 
Company dba US Life ("US Life"), having been personally served wi th summons 
and complaint in the manner prescribed by law, and having failed to appear and 
answer the Plaintiff's Complaint filed herein, and the time allowed by law for 
answering having expired, and the Default of the said Defendant having been duly 
entered; and the Court having received and fully considered Plaintiffs' Complaint, 
Motion for Default Judgment, Default, and all other pleadings and documents in the 
000004 
file; and it appearing to the Court based upon the foregoing that Plaintiff is entitled 
to Default Judgment and that the amount of Plaintiff's damages is established by 
the foregoing pleadings and that there is no just reason for delay and that this 
Default Judgment should be a final and appealable judgment under Rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of this Court be 
awarded in favor of Plaintiff Classic Cabinets, Inc., and against Defendant All 
American Life Insurance Company dba US Life, in the sum of $77,522.12, plus 
pre-judgment interest in the amount of $13,566.42, together with attorneys fees 
and costs in the amount of $1,131.00, for a total judgment of $92,219.54, 
bearing interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry hereof; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this judgment shall be 
augmented in the amount of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in 
collecting said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit; and it is further 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there is no just reason for delay 
and this Default Judgment is expressly directed to be a final and appealable 
judgment within the meaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this U (day of VTJ^Q , , 1 996. 
'-. v ^ W a n k G. Noel 
\ - ^;;:^cE)1 strict Judge 
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Chris L. Schmutz 
CHRIS L. SCHMUTZ, P.C. 
265 East 100 South #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 364-0256 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLASSIC CABINETS, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, ALL AMERICAN LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY dba US LIFE, 
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
LEON J . MUNYAN and KATHY L. 
MUNYAN, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF FEES 
AND COSTS 
^ > o y ^>^-
Civil No. 960900355 CV 
Judge Frank G. Noel 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
Chris L. Schmutz, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am a member in good standing of the Utah Bar and am counsel for 
Plaintiff in the above-captioned case. 
2. I have spent at least 10 hours in connection with pursuing the claims of 
Classic Cabinets which are set forth in the Complaint filed herein; including 
0UU006 
investigation and research, preparation of complaint and summons, and preparation 
of default pleadings against All American Life Insurance Company dba US Life. 
3. I have billed my time at the hourly rate of $100.00 per hour. 
4. I believe the time and hourly rate to be reasonable in connection with a 
matter of this complexity, in the Salt Lake City area. 
5. In addition to the fees incurred herein, Classic Cabinets has incurred the 
following costs: filing fee for complaint ($120.00), and service of process on All 
American Life Insurance Company dba US Life ($11.00). 
DATED this / ^ > d a y of February, 1996. 
Chris L. Schmutz 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s ^ ^ T ^ d a y or hebruary, l y y b . 
Notaiv Pubiic ^ 
TERRI L AHTER8URN | 
1025 South Lake Street i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 ! 
My Commission Expires « 
August 23, 1993 
Stato of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
£%,,,%! *ef- jj^ /<?<?# 
Notary PublicJ 
Residing at: / ^ ^ c : ? ^ ^ ^ / <^/*J<^ 
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JAN - 5 1998 - . ^ it ^ 
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BY DEPUTY CLERK. 
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Gregory M. Simonsen (#4669) 
Merrill F.Nelson (#3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant All American Life Insurance Company 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLASSIC CABINETS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY dba US LIFE, a New Jersey 
corporation, MIDLAND NATIONAL LIFE 
INSURANCE CO., a joint stock 
corporation, LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE 
CO.. a South Carolina corporation, LEON J. 
MUNYAN and KATHY L. MUNYAN dba 
MUNYAN & ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF STAY AND APPROVAL 
OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
Civil No. 960900355 CV 
Judae Frank G. Noel 
Based on the Stipulation for Stay Pending Appeal and Approval of Supersedeas Bond 
filed herein, it is hereby ordered that enforcement of the Order Denying All American's Motion 
000008 
^ MM 
to Set Aside Default Judgment is stayed pending appeal, and the proposed supersedeas bond is 
approved. JAN 0 5 JS3§ 
DATED this day of December, 1997. 
BY TI 
Frank G."? 
District 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of December, 1997,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order of Stay and Approval of Supersedeas Bond to be mailed through 
United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Chris L. Schmutz 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
W:\7000\723 5\0002\MfnStaOr.pld 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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)s of appeal. The time for 
lent , tolled by a party's 
motion, s tar ts to run on 
al court enters its signed 
tion. Gallardo v. Bolinder, 
t. App. 1990). 
1 "Objections to the Pro-
elusions and Judgment," 
motion was in substance 
jle, inasmuch as it asked 
indings and to amend its 
ments ; therefore, defen-
ce time for filing a notice 
otion was denied. Reeves 
Id 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 
aade no award of general 
icient in form, plaintiff's 
'. the jury be sent back for 
and her failure to object 
ich conference regarding 
the verdict constituted 
a new trial or to appeal 
C. Penney Co., 537 P.2d 
irdict failed to mention 
one par t of a cause of 
:iff failed to raise this 
le jury was discharged, 
waived and could not be 
new trial. Ute-Cal Land 
)5 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980). 
"aimers' Union Property 
n, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 
Id 722 (1958); Howard v. 
49, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); 
eal Estate , Inc., 15 Utah 
964); Hanson v. General 
J tah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
). v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
>4); Porcupine Reservoir 
Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 
Watson v. Anderson, 29 
1003 (1973); Nichols v. 
(Utah 1976); Edgar v. 
.Utah 1977); Time Com. 
11, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah 
ntgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
ontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 
I 1981); Mulherin v. 
I P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); 
y, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 
eland Cement Co. v. 
(Utah 1983); Nelson v. 
37 (Utah 1983); Golden 
tas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
705 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
ied Washington County 
R2d 679 (Utah 1986); 
P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); 
)P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987); 
>2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 
3o. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
>9); Paryzek v. Paryzek, 
. App. 1989); Allred v. 
tah Ct. App. 1992); Ong 
th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 
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447 (Utah 1993); Putvin v. Thompson, 878 P.2d App. 1997); PDQ Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 329 
1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Ron Shepherd Ins. v. T T i -L A J ~ °— n A ' T T i - L n i A— mnrr\. n n ^ 
Shields 882 P2d 650 (Utah 1994); Commercial 
Jay. Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105 (Utah Ct. 
Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); PDQ 
Lube Ctr., Inc. v. Huber, 949 P.2d 792 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial 
R§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L-R- — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. 
propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or 
settlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501. 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or pre-
mises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
AL.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637. 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
AL.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 AJL.R.4th 1170. 
Ju ry trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
Propriety of limiting to issue of damages 
alone new trial granted on ground of inade-
quacy of damages — modern cases, 5 A.L.R.5th 
875. 
After-acquired evidence of employee's mis-
conduct as barring or limiting recovery in ac-
tion for wrongful discharge, 34 A.L.R.5th 699. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of 
seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions 
under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
USCS §§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. 
Fed. 189. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any 
party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of 
an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in 
the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so 
corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvert-
ence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
ooooio 
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was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Adviso ry C o m m i t t e e Note . — The 1998 
amendment eliminates as grounds for a motion 
the following: "(4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 
4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action." This basis for a motion is not found 
in the federal rule. The committee concluded 
the clause was ambiguous and possibly in con-
flict with rules permitting service by means 
other than personal service. 
A m e n d m e n t No te s . — The 1998 amend-
ment deleted the former fourth ground for a 
motion in Subdivision (b), as described in the 
Advisory Committee Note above, and renum-
bered the grounds accordingly. 
Compi l e r ' s No te s . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
— Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
— Order prepared by counsel. 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
Default judgment. 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
—Factual error. 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. . 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any other r e a s o n just i fy ing relief." 
Subdivision (b)(7) embodies three require-
ments: First, tha t the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); 
second, that the reason justify relief; and third, 
tha t the motion be made within a reasonable 
OOOOll 
time. Laub v. Sout 
P.2d 1304 (Utah 
Chipman & Sons, « 
1991). 
Where a defenda 
ment based on Sul 
his motion for a n e 
violated Rule 5(a) 
providing defendar 
thereby causing si 
tiff's failure to p ^ 
summary judgmer 
latter claimed was 
plaintiff's part, the 
lieved in denying 
fraud was not pres< 
ered a lapse in proc 
Walker v. Carlson, r, 
1987). 
Defendant's claij 
tered into an ill-a 
fully understanding 
rectly characterizec 
inadvertence, surpi 
vision (b)(1); becaus 
Subdivision (b)(7) cc 
be used to circumv 
period. Richins v. D( 
P.2d 382 (Utah Ct . . 
In an action aga: 
construction and mi 
the county was nc 
Subdivision (b)(7) b 
ernmental immuni 
Court decision spec; 
relied on by the cou. 
Hart v. Salt Lake Co 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997 
—Default judgmei 
It was not an abm 
court to relieve a d( 
allow her to answer 
she had mistakenly ; 
protected by a divorc 
decree required her 
gation and defend i 
Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 
Trial judge did not 
ing to set aside defa 
dant asserted tha t 
was invalid and thei 
it. Board of Educ. v. 
P.2d 806 (1963). 
Where any reasor 
defaulting party, cou 
granting relief from; 
it appears tha t to do J 
tial injustice to 
Westinghouse Elec. 
Larsen Contractor, 5 
Subdivision (b)(7) 
where defendant hus 
default judgment of < 
its entry on the groui 
incorrectly stated the 
that he had not recer 
divorce decree; theref 
diction to disturb the 
Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 
Where defendant s 
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y the attorney of record of 
isjgninent of the judgment 
executes such satisfaction 
7 of the judgment, in the 
.nstrument, duly acknowl-
r (2) by acknowledgment of 
ter or attorne3r and entered 
n the county where first 
id witnessed by the clerk, 
judgment, or as to one or 
all state the amount paid 
lebtors, naming them. 
court. When a judgment 
satisfied of record, or when 
lave been lost, the court in 
-ed may, upon motion and 
attorney of the judgment 
ly enter an order declaring 
faction to be entered upon 
pt of a satisfaction of judg-
iged, the clerk shall file the 
and enter it on the register 
a brief statement of the 
mount paid, on the margin 
date of filing of such satis-
len a judgment snaiY have 
rt, or as to any judgment 
red upon the docket by the 
extent of such satisfaction, 
a lien. In case of partial 
thereafter be issued on the 
endorsed with a memoran-
nd shall direct the officer to 
or to collect only from the 
e thereon. 
?action in other count ies . 
ent shall have been entered 
•unty where such judgment 
.nscript of satisfaction, or a 
xh satisfaction, may be filed 
t in any other county where 
keted. Thereupon a similar 
all be made by the clerk of 
ave the same effect as in the 
aally entered. 
2nts of judgment . 
rovisions of Rule 61, a new 
* of the parties and on all or 
following causes; provided, 
new trial in an action tried 
•en t he ju4gmen t i f one has 
stimony, amend findings of 
ke new findings and conclu-
ew judgment: 
:eedings of the court, jury or 
T of the court, or abuse of 
party was prevented from 
7; and whenever any one or 
;n induced to assent to any 
to a finding on any question 
irt, by resort to a determina-
of bribery, such misconduct 
rit of any one of the jurors. 
which ordinary prudence 
nst. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party 
making the application, which he could not, with reason-
able diligence, have discovered and produced a t the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or preju-
dice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be 
served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; t ime for filing. When the application for a 
new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it 
shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new 
trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may 
be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 days 
either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by 
written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) O n init iat ive of court. Not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a 
new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new 
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the 
grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to a l t e r o r a m e n d a judgment . A motion to 
after or amend the judgment sftatf be served not later than 10 
days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes . Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising 
from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and 
after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the 
pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and 
thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected 
with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mis t akes ; i n a d v e r t e n c e ; ex cu s ab l e neglect; newly 
d i s c o v e r e d ev idence ; fraud, etc . On motion and upon such 
terms as are just , the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judg-
ment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not 
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in 
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) thejudgmenthas been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospec-
tive application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. Amotion under this Subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment 
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
No error in either the admission or the exc)usJon 
dence, and no error or defect in any ruling or ordei 
anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the pa 
is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action
 a p 
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The co 
every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
 e r i 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substi 
rights of the parties. 
Rule 62. S t a y of p r o c e e d i n g s to enforce a judgtne 
(a) Stay upon entry of judgment . Execution
 0 r 
proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue inured 
upon the entry of the judgment, unless the cou>t j 
discretion and on such conditions for the security c 
adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs. 
(b) S t a y on mot ion for n e w trial or for j u d g m e n t . ! 
discretion and on such conditions for the security
 0 
adverse party as are proper, the court may stay the exec 
o f
'
 o r
 . ^ P r o c e e d m g s to enforce, a judgment pendin 
disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or am 
judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for 
from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60 o 
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for a dir 
verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a motion for ar 
ment to the findings or for additional findings made tmr 
to Rule 52(b). 
(c) Injunction pending appeal . When an appeal fs 1 
from an interlocutory or final judgment granting, di^so' 
or denying an injunction, the court in its discretion 
suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction durin 
pendency of the appeal upon such conditions as i t c0ns 
proper for the security of the rights of the adverse p^rtf 
(d) S t a y upon appeal . When an appeal is takei 
appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a 
unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited by law
 0 r 
rules. The bond may be given at or after the time of f\lin 
notice of appeal. The stay is effective when the supers* 
bond is approved by the court. 
(e) S t a y in favor of t h e s t a t e , or agency thereof. > 
an appeal is taken by the United States, the state of t J t f 
an officer or agency of either, or by direction of any depart 
of either, and the operation or enforcement of the jua§m ( 
stayed, no bond, obligation, or other security shall be *-eq 
from the appellant. 
(f) S t a y i n q u o w a r r a n t o p r o c e e d i n g s . Where the d 
dant is adjudged guilty of usurping, intruding into o*
 UI 
fully holding public office, civil or military, within this : 
the execution of the judgment shall not be stayed d 
appeal. 
(g) P o w e r of a p p e l l a t e c o u r t n o t l im i t ed . The pr0vi 
in this rule do not limit any power of an appellate co^rt 
a judge or justice thereof to stay proceedings or to sUS] 
modify, restore, or grant an injunction, or extraordinary 
or to make any order appropriate to preserve the s t a tu s q 
the effectiveness of the judgment subsequently to be ^ n t 
(h) Stay of judgment upon mult iple c la ims, ty] 
court has ordered a final judgment on some but not an
 c 
claims presented in the action under the conditions s tat 
Rule 54(b), the court may stay enforcement of tha t judg 
until the entering of a subsequent judgment or judgment-
may prescribe such conditions as are necessary to sec;Ur 
benefit thereof to the party in whose favor the j u d g m € 
entered. 
(i) Form of s u p e r s e d e a s bond ; d e p o s i t in l ieu of iJ 
Waiver of bond; j u r i s d i c t i o n ove r s u r e t i e s to be s^t i 
in undertaking. 
(DA supersedeas bond given under Subdivision (d; 
be either a commercial bond having a surety autho r i2 
UU012 
